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Miller: Climate Change Litigation

CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION IN
THE WAKE OF AEP V. CONNECTICUT
AND AES V. STEADFAST: OUT TO
PASTURE, BUT NOT OUT OF STEAM
CECILIA O’CONNELL MILLER*

I.

INTRODUCTION

On April 19, 2011, two courts heard oral arguments in cases that
will define the future of climate change litigation for decades to come. In
American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut (hereinafter AEP), the
United States Supreme Court considered whether environmental
advocates can use a federal common-law nuisance claim as a vehicle for
seeking redress for climate change accruing from greenhouse gas
(hereinafter GHG) emissions. Just a hundred miles south that same day,
the Virginia Supreme Court heard oral arguments in AES Corporation v.
Steadfast (hereinafter Steadfast), in which Virginia’s highest court
considered whether a commercial general liability insurer must provide a
defense in climate change litigation.
Both courts issued holdings that appear, at first blush, to
significantly undercut the viability of climate change litigation. In AEP,
the United States Supreme Court concluded the Clean Air Act and the
Environmental Protection Agency’s ongoing steps to implement the
Clean Air Act displace a federal common-law public nuisance claim to
limit carbon dioxide emissions. In Steadfast, the Virginia Supreme Court
held an insurer was not obligated, as a matter of law, to defend a
policyholder under a commercial general liability policy in climate
change litigation because the alleged conduct of contributing to global
warming was intentional and thus did not constitute an occurrence as
required by the policy language. However, in both cases it is precisely

* Counsel, Latham & Watkins LLP, San Diego, California. Ms. Miller specializes in insurance
coverage litigation in state and federal courts across the country at both the trial and appellate level.
Ms. Miller received her JD with highest honors from the Catholic University of America Columbus
School of Law, where she was valedictorian of her class. She received a Bachelor of Arts degree
with honors in political science from Boston College. The author wishes to thank Sofiya Feerer and
all the editors of the Golden Gate University Environmental Law Journal for their helpful comments
and suggestions.
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what these courts left unsaid that leaves open the floodgates to future
climate risk claims.
Specifically, in narrowing its holding to displacement, the Supreme
Court in AEP declined to rule on preemption and the viability of statelaw tort claims, which the plaintiffs also pled. Rather than forestall the
filing of future climate change litigations, the AEP holding simply
crystallizes the forum and the likely claim, namely, state-law nuisance.
In several respects, state courts present a more hospitable forum for such
litigation. Thus, by relegating these claims to state courts, hence
implicitly authorizing such claims to continue in those forums, the
Court’s decision in AEP may effectively increase the number of climate
change litigations filed in state courts in the coming years.
Similarly, the Virginia Supreme Court’s holding in Steadfast,
declining insurance coverage in an unrelated climate change litigation,
does not end the prospect that insurers may be called upon to defend
these litigations and pay for any resulting damages. The precedential
impact of Steadfast may be limited because state law governs the
construction of insurance policies and the precise terms of the policy at
issue control that interpretation. More critically, an insurer’s ultimate
liability for climate change damages will rest on whether a particular
court classifies carbon dioxide as a pollutant within the scope of a
policy’s pollution exclusion. The Steadfast court declined to rule on this
issue. With the lynchpin to insurance coverage still unsettled, insurers
remain at risk.
Part II of this Article analyzes the holding and ramifications of the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in AEP. Part III analyzes the
holding and ramifications of the Virginia Supreme Court’s decision in
Steadfast. Part IV synthesizes the ramifications of these two decisions
and predicts that climate change litigation remains viable, both on the
underlying claim and related coverage issues. Thus, rather than take the
steam out of climate change litigation, the AEP and Steadfast decisions
simply send this litigation back to the states.
II.

AEP V. CONNECTICUT: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
IMPLICITLY AFFIRMS THE VIABILITY OF STATE PUBLIC NUISANCE
LAW FOR ASSERTING CLIMATE CHANGE CLAIMS

On Monday, June 20, 2011, the United States Supreme Court
released its decision in AEP.1 In an 8-0 ruling, the Court held that the
Clean Air Act (hereinafter CAA) and Congress’s delegation of authority

1

Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
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to the Environmental Protection Agency (hereinafter EPA) to regulate
carbon dioxide emissions from power plants displaces any federal
common-law nuisance claim seeking a judicially mandated cap on GHG
emissions.2 On the issue of Article III standing, an equally divided Court
affirmed the Second Circuit’s exercise of jurisdiction.3 Most notably, the
Court did not reach the issue of pre-emption, and sent the issue of
whether the state law of nuisance provides a cognizable theory back to
the Second Circuit.4
A.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The AEP litigation originated in 2004 when a group of eight States,5
along with New York City, and a group of three non-profit land trusts,6
(collectively, the Plaintiffs, who were the Respondents before the
Supreme Court) filed two separate complaints against five power
companies7 (collectively, the Defendants, who were the Petitioners
before the Supreme Court) in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York.
The Plaintiffs alleged that GHG emissions from the Defendants’
power plants have significantly contributed to global warming.8
According to the Plaintiffs, the Defendants “are the five largest emitters
of carbon dioxide in the United States.”9 The Plaintiffs contended that,
by contributing to global warming, the Defendants’ emissions created a
“substantial and unreasonable interference with public rights” in
contravention of the federal common law of interstate nuisance.10 In the
alternative, the Plaintiffs sought redress under state tort law.11
According to the states and New York City, climate change puts at

2

Id. at 2532.
Id. at 2535.
4
Id. at 2540.
5
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated,
582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009) (listing State Plaintiffs California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New
York, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin).
6
Id. (listing non-profit Plaintiffs Open Space Institute, Inc., Open Space Conservatory, Inc.,
and the Audubon Society of New Hampshire).
7
Id. (listing Defendants American Electric Power Co., and American Electric Power
Service Corp. (together AEP), Southern Company, Xcel Entergy Inc., the Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA), and Cinergy Corporation.).
8
See Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S.Ct. at 2534.
9
Id. (reciting Plaintiffs’ Petition for Certiorari, which noted the collective annual emissions
of the Defendants represent twenty-five percent of emissions from the domestic electric power sector
and ten percent of emissions from all domestic human activities).
10
Id.
11
Id.
3
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risk public lands, infrastructure, and human health.12 According to the
private land trusts, climate change poses a risk of the destruction of the
habitats of animals and rare species of trees and plants inhabiting land
owned by the trusts.13 Thus, the Plaintiffs collectively sought an
injunction requiring each Defendant to cap its carbon dioxide emissions
and then reduce the emissions each year by a specific percentage for, at a
minimum, the next ten years.14
In the district court, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. The Defendants argued that a federal
common-law cause of action to abate GHG emissions does not exist, that
the claims raised political questions unfit for adjudication by the courts,
that Congress has displaced any possible federal common-law cause of
action seeking regulations of GHG emissions, and that Plaintiffs did not
have standing to sue on account of global warming.15
Relying on Baker v. Carr, the district court dismissed the Plaintiffs’
suits as presenting non-justiciable political questions.16 In Baker, the
United States Supreme Court described the test of whether a case is
justiciable, in light of the separation of powers doctrine, as “whether the
duty asserted can be judicially identified and its breach judicially
determined, and whether protection for the right asserted can be
judicially molded.”17 Courts recognized six factors as indicative of a nonjusticiable political question, including, of most relevance here, “the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for non-judicial discretion.”18 Applying these factors, the district
court in AEP concluded:
The explicit statements of Congress and the Executive on the issue of
global climate change in general and their specific refusal to impose
the limits on carbon dioxide emissions . . . confirm that making the
“initial policy determination[s]” addressing global climate change is
an undertaking for the political branches.

Because

resolution

of

the

issues

presented

here

requires

12

Id.
Id.; see also Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co,, 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 268 (S.D. N.Y.
2005) (describing the causes and evolution of global warming).
14
Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S.Ct. at 2534; Connecticut, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 270.
15
Connecticut, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 270.
16
Id. at 271-74.
17
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962).
18
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217; see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277-78 (2004) (listing
the six Baker tests).
13
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identification and balancing of economic, environmental, foreign policy,
and national security interests, “an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for non-judicial discretion” is required. Indeed, the questions
presented here “uniquely demand single-voiced statement of the
Government’s views.”19
On the Plaintiffs’ appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the judgment
of the district court and held that the political question doctrine did not
bar the Plaintiffs’ case from adjudication.20 Although the district court
had not ruled on the issue of standing, the Second Circuit did not limit its
analysis and considered other grounds raised in the Defendants’ original
motion to dismiss. The Second Circuit held “that all of [the] Plaintiffs
have standing; that the federal common law of nuisance governs their
claims; that Plaintiffs have stated claims under the federal common law
of nuisance; that their claims are not displaced; and that TVA’s
[Tennessee Valley Authority’s] alternate grounds for dismissal are
without merit.”21 In concluding all Plaintiffs (including private parties)
had stated a federal common-law claim of nuisance, the Second Circuit
relied on the Restatement’s public nuisance standard and Supreme Court
jurisprudence holding that states may maintain suits against other states
or out-of-state industries for air- and water-pollution abatement.22
In determining that the CAA did not displace the federal common
law of nuisance, the Second Circuit relied on Supreme Court
jurisprudence finding displacement when legislation enacts a
comprehensive regulatory program with supervision by an expert
administrative agency.23 Ruling in September of 2009, the Second Circuit
determined the EPA had failed to promulgate any rule addressing
regulation of GHG emissions, stating, “Until EPA completes the

19

Connecticut, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 274 (citation omitted).
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 332 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct.
2527 (2011).
21
Id. at 315.
22
Id. at 350-52, 364-66 (relying on Illinois v. Milwaukee (Milwaukee I), 406 U.S. 91 (1972)
(“The Court set out no requirement that only states could bring claims under the federal common law
of nuisance.”).
23
Id. at 378-79 (noting EPA’s proposed findings and preliminary action to regulate
emissions; quoting Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 319-24 (1981), in
concluding, “We cannot say, therefore, that EPA’s issuance of proposed findings suffices to regulate
greenhouse gases in a way that ‘speaks directly’ to Plaintiff’s problems and thereby displaces
Plaintiff’s existing remedies under federal common law.”); see id. at 381 (“With respect to the
greenhouse gas emissions causing the alleged nuisance at issue in the instant cases, however, EPA
has yet to make any determination that such emissions are subject to regulation under the Act, must
less endeavor actually to regulate the emissions. . . . Accordingly, the problem of which Plaintiffs
complain certainly has not ‘been thoroughly addressed’ by the CAA..” (citing Milwaukee II, 451
U.S. at 320)).
20
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rulemaking process, we cannot speculate as to whether the hypothetical
regulation of greenhouse gases under the [CAA] would in fact ‘speak[ ]
directly’ to the ‘particular issue’ raised here by Plaintiffs.”24
The Second Circuit denied Defendants’ request for a rehearing en
banc, after which the Defendants sought review by the Supreme Court.25
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on December 6, 2010.26 The
Supreme Court heard oral argument on April 19, 2011.27
B.

ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL

i.

Defendants’ Argument

The Defendants based their appeal of the Second Circuit’s decision
finding a cognizable claim primarily on the absence of standing,
including a lack of prudential standing—although the Defendants had not
raised that theory in the district court.28
As to Article III standing to bring a climate change nuisance suit,
Defendants focused on how the Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate an
“injury-in-fact” that could be traceable to the challenged conduct of these
Defendants.29 Instead, the pleadings asserted the Defendants contributed
to climate change generally through their emissions, and this resulting
climate change contributed generally to an increased risk of injuries.30 By
this logic, the Defendants argued, “any entity” could sue another entity
because all entities contribute in some manner to global climate change.31
Defendants also contended the chain of causation necessary to
sufficiently establish Article III standing omitted many other potential
sources of the alleged harms, unfairly targeting these five defendants.32

24

Id. at 380 (emphasis added).
See Docket in Case No. 05-5104, Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., Inc., U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Order dated March 5, 2010 (denying petition for rehearing
and rehearing en banc).
26
See 131 S. Ct. 813 (2010).
27
Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2527.
28
See Brief for the Petitioners at 12-16, Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527
(2011) (No. 10-174), 2011 WL 334707 [hereinafter Brief for the Petitioners]. Compare Connecticut
v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 332-47 (2d Cir. 2009) (addressing extensively the issue of
standing) with Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co,, 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D. N.Y. 2005)
(dismissing case exclusively on the basis of a non-justiciable political question).
29
Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 28, at 17 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).
30
See id. at 18.
31
Id. at 19.
32
See id. at 21 (arguing the Defendants are but five of “billions of independent sources
25
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Absent joinder of all potential sources of emissions, the claims as pled
could not achieve the desired reduction in emissions.33 The Defendants
thus argued the Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the redressability prong of
Article III standing because the relief requested would fall short of
redressing the alleged injury.34
The Defendants further argued that the Plaintiffs’ claims were
barred by prudential standing limitations. By this theory, the Defendants
contended the Plaintiffs’ claims constituted simply a “generalized
grievance.”35 Given the commonality of potential liability for nearly
every organization in the world allegedly accruing from GHG emissions,
the Plaintiffs’ allegations were unfit for a judicial solution absent an
existing legislative statement or systematic regulatory response.36
Even if the Court found standing, the Defendants contended that
multiple other grounds existed warranting dismissal. In particular, the
Defendants argued that, even if the Plaintiffs had properly stated a
nuisance cause of action, any such claims had been displaced, at a
minimum, by Congress’s enactment of the CAA.37 According to the
Defendants, the CAA “establishes a ‘comprehensive’ regulatory process”
authorizing the EPA to weigh the costs and benefits to society in
determining the appropriate levels of GHG emissions.38 Thus, the
Defendants proffered that the correct cause of action for the Plaintiffs
was embedded in the CAA.39 In other words, congressional intent
around the world over the course of centuries” contributing to alleged climate change).
33
See id. at 21 (arguing the Plaintiffs’ alleged injury can be redressed only if “sources other
than the defendants simultaneously reduce their emissions”); id. at 24 (“[T]he vast bulk of GHG
emissions are from sources that are not parties to this case . . . . [T]here is no basis to believe that
reductions ordered here . . . would lead to any overall reduction.”).
34
See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (“[I]t must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the
injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.”).
35
See Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 28, at 30 (characterizing the emission of GHG as
“common to (and necessary for) virtually every enterprise on the planet;” thus the alleged injury
“will allegedly be felt by virtually every person around the world.”); see also Elk Grove Unified Sch.
Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) (explaining the doctrine of prudential standing); Valley
Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75
(1982).
36
See Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 28, at 30.
37
See id. at 31; see also Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 314-15 (1981)
(stating the federal common law is relied upon in the “absence of an applicable act of Congress,”
thus, when Congress “addresses a question . . . the need for such an unusual exercise of lawmaking
by federal courts disappears”).
38
Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 28, at 31.
39
Id. at 44 (“Congress’s decision to provide these express avenues for States and others to
seek emissions limitations means that federal courts may not allow plaintiffs to bypass those paths
and seek similar relief in diverse district courts under federal common law standards fashioned by
judges.”); see also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 290 (2001) (“The express provision of one
method of enforcing a substantive rule suggests that Congress intended to preclude others.”).
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demonstrated that the EPA had sole discretion in regulating GHG
emissions, thus displacing any federal common-law nuisance claim by
the Plaintiffs.
The Defendants further argued that the case presented a nonjusticiable political question.40 Hewing close to the reasoning of the
District Court, the Defendants argued that the question presented
required “an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion,” that is beyond “judicially discoverable and manageable
standards.”41
ii.

Plaintiffs’ Argument

In response the Plaintiffs sought to demonstrate Article III standing
by establishing causation, redressability and injury in fact.42 The
Plaintiffs further sought to challenge the characterization of the issue as
exclusively a political question and dispute displacement.43
As to causation, the Plaintiffs claimed that global warming already
caused demonstrable harm and will cause future injuries.44 Using the
traceability standard enunciated in Massachusetts, the Plaintiffs argued
the particular emissions of the Defendants constituted a “meaningful
contribution” to these injuries.45 Discounting the Defendants’ argument
that they were but five of billions of carbon dioxide emitters on the
planet, the Plaintiffs relied upon the principle that even one who pollutes
to a slight extent may be held liable and thus satisfy the “meaningful
contribution” standard of Massachusetts.46
Turning to the redressability prong, the Plaintiffs countered that the
relief sought need not “reverse” global warming; instead, the proper

40

Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 28, at 46.
Id. (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
42
Brief for Respondents Connecticut, New York, California, Iowa, Rhode Island, Vermont,
and the City of New York at 8-9, Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (No.
10-174), 2011 WL 915093 [hereinafter Brief for Respondent States].
43
Id. at 9.
44
See id. at 12-13 (noting earlier seasonal melting of the Sierra Nevada snowpack, which in
turn reduces the amount of drinking water available in California; eminent beach erosion in coastal
states; and future increases in heat related deaths in New York City).
45
See id. at 14. (“The percentage of global emissions at issue in [Massachusetts](well under
six percent) is comparable to the percentage attributed by the complaint to defendants here: about 2.5
percent of all carbon dioxide emissions worldwide.”)
46
Id. at 15 (“As the Restatement explains, ‘[i]t may, for example, be unreasonable to pollute
a stream to only a slight extent, harmless in itself, when the defendant knows that pollution by others
is approaching or has reached the point where it causes or threatens serious interference with the
rights of those who use the water.’” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 840E cmt. b
(1979))).
41
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inquiry was whether the relief sought would “slow or reduce it.”47 In
other words, the fact that the risk would be lessened, regardless of how
minimally, proves that the Plaintiffs’ allegations satisfy the redressability
prong of standing.48
Asserting they had demonstrated a concrete injury, the Plaintiffs
disputed any distinct prudential standing limitations that preclude socalled “generalized grievances.”49 Instead, Article III’s requirement for
“injury-in-fact” necessarily subsumed a prohibition on such generalized
grievances.50 According to Plaintiffs, the Court had found widespread
and widely shared injuries to be “sufficiently concrete and specific.”51
In denying the case presented a political question, the Plaintiffs
similarly relied on Baker v. Carr and its six-factor test.52 Because a
ruling would provide a remedy as to these particular parties, and did not
contemplate a nationwide policy that might be at odds with other
branches of government, the case did not present a political question.53
The Plaintiffs disputed displacement on multiple levels. The
Plaintiffs contended their claims encompassed federal common law.54
Plaintiffs further claimed there was no displacement and no risk of a
parallel system because Congress remains free to act and thus displace
any common-law action taken by the courts in this case.55 The Plaintiffs
also challenged the Defendants’ argument that displacement occurs
whenever the field has been occupied; instead, Plaintiffs contended, the
field must be occupied in a particular manner for displacement.56

47
48

Id. at 16-17 (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 525 (2007)).
Brief for Respondent States, supra note 42, at 17-18 (relying on Massachusetts, 549 U.S.

at 526).
49

See id. at 23.
See id. at 23; see e.g., Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439 (2007) (stating the general
grievance principle); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23-25 (1998) (holding that the
right to vote is “sufficiently concrete and specific such that the fact that it is widely shared does not
deprive Congress of constitutional power to authorize its vindication in the federal courts”); Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992) (stating that a claim for only general grievances
will not satisfy Article III standing).
51
Brief for Respondent States, supra note 42, at 25; see also Akins, 524 U.S. at 20-25.
52
Brief for Respondent States, supra note 42, at 31-32.
53
See id. at 30-31 (“EPA may limit carbon dioxide emission from existing power plants, and
thereby displace plaintiffs' federal common-law claims. Congress similarly may pass legislation
modifying or displacing federal common law in this area. As a result, this case presents no risk that
the judiciary will develop a “parallel” regulatory system that would “frustrate and complicate” EPA's
regulatory undertakings . . . or that common-law decisions will “conflict [] with current and future
legislation and regulation addressing greenhouse gas emissions.”) (internal citations omitted); id. at
35-36 (discussing the specific contours of the injunctive relief the Plaintiffs could obtain).
54
See id. at 37-38.
55
Brief for Respondent States, supra note 42, at 30.
56
Id. at 47-48 (quoting Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 324 (1981)).
50
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THE AEP DECISION

The Court unanimously ruled on June 20, 2011, that the CAA and
the EPA’s actions authorized by the CAA displaced the federal common
law of public nuisance as a means for limiting carbon dioxide
emissions.57 Justice Ginsburg authored the opinion, in which Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Breyer and Kagan joined.58
Justice Alito filed an opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.59 Justice Sotomayor
took no part in the decision.60 Due to her recusal, the Court was equally
divided on the issue of standing and thus affirmed the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Second Circuit.61 The Court’s ruling was based on the
following principles.
i.

The Court’s Prior Decision in Massachusetts v. EPA and the EPA’s
Response

The Court’s 2007 opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA figured heavily
in the Court’s consideration.62 There, the Court held the EPA had
misread the CAA in denying a rulemaking petition that sought GHG
emission controls on new motor vehicles.63 The Court concluded GHG
emissions qualify as air pollutants within the CAA.64 As a consequence,
GHG emissions are within the regulatory ambit of the EPA. Because the
EPA has regulatory authority to set GHG emission standards, but had
offered no “reasoned explanation” for its failure to so act, the Court
determined the Agency had not acted “in accordance with the law” in
denying the rulemaking petition.65
Having concluded the CAA authorized regulation of carbon dioxide
emissions by the EPA, the Court in AEP briefly surveyed the EPA’s
57

Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2531-32.
Id.
59
See id. at 2540-41 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justices
Alito and Thomas sought to clarify their ongoing disagreement with the Court’s majority opinion in
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); see id. (concurring with the Court’s displacement
analysis on the assumption, “for the sake of argument,” that the majority’s interpretation of the CAA
in Massachusetts v. EPA is correct).
60
Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2540.
61
See id. at 2535 (Justice Sotomayor recused herself because she had served, before her
elevation to the United States Supreme Court, on the Second Circuit panel that considered
Connecticut v. AEP. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 313 (2d Cir. 2009).
62
See Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2532-33.
63
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007); see also id. at 530 n.29.
64
Id. at 532.
65
Id. at 534.
58
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course of action to date.66 Following the Court’s decision in
Massachusetts, the EPA initiated the process of regulating carbon
dioxide emissions through rulemaking, ultimately concluding that
“compelling” evidence demonstrated that “anthropogenic”67 emissions of
GHG contributed to climate change and global warming.68
The Court in AEP recited from the EPA rulemaking the following
“consequent dangers” of GHG emissions:
[I]ncreases in heat-related deaths; coastal inundation and erosion
caused by melting icecaps and rising sea levels; more frequent and
intense hurricanes, floods and other “extreme weather events” that
cause death and destroy infrastructure; drought due to reductions in
mountain snowpack and shifting precipitation patterns; destruction of
ecosystems supporting animals and plants; and potentially “significant
disruptions” in food production.69

In 2010, the EPA and the Department of Transportation issued rules
addressing vehicle emissions.70 Most significantly, the EPA also
commenced, under section 111 of the CAA, rulemaking to impose limits
on GHG emissions from new, modified, and existing fossil-fuel-fired
power plants.71 The EPA also agreed, by virtue of a March 2011
settlement that included “the majority of the plaintiffs in this very case,”
to issue a proposed rule by July of 2011 and a final rule by May of
2012.72 Accordingly, unlike the Second Circuit, the AEP Court in
66

See Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2533.
Anthropogenic Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM , www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/anthropogenic (last visited Dec. 12, 2011) (defining “anthropogenic” as “of, relating to, or
resulting from the influence of human beings on nature”).
68
See Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2533; see also Endangerment and Cause or
Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg.
66,496, 66,517-24 (Dec. 15, 2009).
69
Id.; see also Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,524-35; Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at
2533, n.2 (listing this panoply of potential harms, the Court, in a footnote, cited a source for a view
contrary to that of the EPA, and emphasized that, “The Court, we caution, endorses no particular
view of the complicated issues related to carbon dioxide emissions and climate change.”).
70
Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel
Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (codified 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86,
600; 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 536-538); Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Fuel Efficiency
Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles, 75 Fed. Reg. 74,152 (proposed Nov.
30, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 1036, 1037, 1065, 1066, 1068; 49 C.F.R. pts. 523,
534, 535).
71
Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2533 (citing 42 U.S.C. §7475(a)(4)(1977); Prevention
of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514,
31,520-21 (June 3, 2010) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51,52, 70, 71)).
72
Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2533; see also Proposed Settlement Agreement, 75
67

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2012

11

Golden Gate University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 7

354

GOLDEN GATE UNIV. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW J.

[Vol. 5

assessing displacement had the benefit of nearly two years of rulemaking
by the EPA in response to the Court’s directive in Massachusetts v.
EPA.73
ii.

Displacement

Having surveyed the EPA’s steps toward regulation,74 and the
comprehensive regulatory scheme contemplated by the CAA, the Court
applied a straightforward test: “whether congressional legislation
excludes the declaration of federal common law is simply whether the
statute ‘speak[s] directly to [the] question’ at issue.”75
In holding the CAA and the EPA actions authorized by the Act
displace a federal common-law right to seek abatement of GHG
emissions, the Court concluded that Congress had spoken directly to
regulation of those emissions.76 The Court first noted that Massachusetts
v. EPA answered in the affirmative the inquiry of whether carbon dioxide
emissions qualified as a pollutant subject to the CAA’s regulatory
framework.77
Next, the Court described the legislative delegation of the regulation
of this pollutant. Initially, section 111 of the CAA obligates the EPA
Administrator to list categories of stationary sources that cause or
contribute to air pollution.78 Thereafter the agency is required to establish
“standards of performance” for emissions from new or modified sources
within each category.79 The Court further noted that the CAA provides
“multiple avenues for enforcement,” including delegation of
implementation and enforcement to the states, criminal penalties for
individuals who violate the standards, and private enforcement actions.80
Most critically, the Court recognized that “[i]f EPA does not set
emissions limits for a particular pollutant or source of pollution, States

Fed. Reg. 82,390, 82,392 (Dec. 30, 2010).
73
See Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2535 (“At the time of the Second Circuit’s
decision, by contrast, EPA had not yet promulgated any rule regulating greenhouse gases, a fact the
court thought dispositive.”).
74
See supra Part II.C.i.
75
Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2537 (recognizing the standard for legislative
displacement was less rigorous than the test for preemption of state law, and quoting Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978)); see also infra Part II.D.
76
Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2537.
77
Id.
78
See id; see also Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411(b)(1)(A) (Westlaw 2011).
79
Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2537; see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411(a)(2), (b)(1)(B), (d)
(Westlaw 2011).
80
Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2538.
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and private parties may petition for a rulemaking on the matter, and
EPA’s response will be reviewable in federal court.”81
Because the CAA “speaks directly” to GHG emissions and the EPA
has commenced rulemaking, “Congress delegated to the EPA the
decision whether and how to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from
power plants,” rendering the Plaintiffs’ federal common-law claims
displaced.82 The Court thus concluded there was “no room for a parallel
track.”83
In response to Plaintiffs’ argument that the EPA’s rulemaking was
still in its nascent stages and the EPA had not “actually exercise[d] its
regulatory authority,” the Court emphasized that the key inquiry was
whether there had been a delegation of the authority, not an assessment
of the extent of that delegation or the resulting regulatory framework.84
Indeed, the Court pragmatically recognized that each resulting regulatory
regime must be tailored to the subject of such regulation.85 Particularly,
in considering the practical limitations upon the regulation of carbon
dioxide, which is omni-present, the Court reasoned that the absence of an
extensive regulatory framework was hardly indicative of Congress’s
intention to occupy the field.86
Thus, whether the EPA “actually” had regulated carbon dioxide
emissions was not relevant to the calculus. Indeed, EPA could respond to
the delegation by declining to regulate, and the federal courts would not
be authorized to use the federal law of nuisance to reverse that agency
decision.87
The Court also recognized that the fact that the EPA may not have
“actually” enacted the regulation simply provided yet another bite at the
apple for Plaintiffs: “If the plaintiffs in this case are dissatisfied with the
outcome of EPA’s forthcoming rulemaking, their recourse under federal
law is to seek Court of Appeals review, and, ultimately, to petition for
81

Id. (emphasis in original); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 7607(b)(1) (Westlaw 2011).
Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2538.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 2538 (“[T]he relevant question for purposes of displacement is ‘whether the field has
been occupied, not whether it has been occupied in a particular manner.’” (quoting Milwaukee v.
Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 324 (1981)).
85
Id. at 2539 (“The appropriate amount of regulation in any particular greenhouse gasproducing sector cannot be prescribed in a vacuum: as with other questions of national and
international policy, informed assessment of competing interests is required”).
86
Id. at 2538 (“Congress could hardly preemptively prohibit every discharge of carbon
dioxide unless covered by a permit. After all, we each emit carbon dioxide merely breathing.”). As
noted infra at Part IV, this commentary suggests how the Court might be guided if ever presented
with the issue of the scope of a pollution exclusion in a commercial general liability policy.
87
See id. (“The Clean Air Act is no less an exercise of the legislature’s ‘considered
judgment’ concerning the regulation of air pollution because it permits emissions until EPA acts.”).
82
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certiorari in this Court.”88 Thus, the Court expressly recognized, in
several sections of the opinion, that the sufficiency of the regulation on
GHG emissions was simply an issue for the Court to address on another
day in a different procedural posture.89
iii. Standing
The Court’s affirmance of the Second Circuit’s determination that
the Plaintiffs satisfied Article III standing by a 4-4 vote does not create
any binding precedent, but it is binding on the parties in the case.90 Thus,
Justice Sotomayor’s recusal eliminated standing as a procedural bar for
these litigants, but it also eliminated precedent upon which future
litigants might rely.91
When equally divided, the Court does not traditionally publish the
individual Justices’ votes, but Justice Ginsburg gave an indication that
the four Justices who voted against Article III standing were the same
four Justices who dissented in Massachusetts.92 Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas dissented in Massachusetts.93
This division may indicate how the Court would decide a similar
Article III case in the future if all nine Justices participate.94 Indeed, in
noting that four Justices would hold that at least some Plaintiffs have
Article III standing under Massachusetts, Justice Ginsburg elaborated
that these same Justices also believe that “no other threshold obstacle
bars review,” intimating that the Defendants’ eleventh-hour “prudential”
argument barring generalized grievances was unmeritorious.95 In a future
climate change litigation involving a state plaintiff, Justice Sotomayor
may join with those Justices adhering to the holding of Massachusetts,
which permitted a state to challenge EPA’s action, thereby producing a
precedential decision upon which future litigants could rely.96
88

Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2539.
See id. at 2538 (“EPA’s response will be reviewable in federal court.”); id. at 2539.
90
See generally Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. 107, 113 (1868) (holding that in a divided
court the judgment “prevents the decision from becoming an authority for other cases . . . . But the
judgment is conclusive and binding in every respect upon the parties.”).
91
See supra note 90.
92
See Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2535 (“Four members of the Court, adhering to a
dissenting opinion in Massachusetts or regarding that decision as distinguishable, would hold that
none of the plaintiffs have Article III standing.” (citation omitted)).
93
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 535 (2007).
94
See Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2540. (Justice Sotomayor did not take part in the AEP
decision).
95
Id. at 2535, n.6.
96
See Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 475 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2007) (remanding to the EPA
rulemaking regulating cooling water intake structures at power plants; reasoning that the EPA had
89
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Political Question Doctrine

Although the political question doctrine had formed the fulcrum of
the debate in the courts below, and by consequence in the Supreme Court
briefing,97 the Court did not affirmatively rule on the application of the
doctrine.98 By declining to affirmatively address the political question
issue, the Supreme Court left standing the Second Circuit’s ruling that
this doctrine does not bar global warming claims.99 However, the Court’s
opinion provides significant guidance as to how the Court may have
considered the issue, had the displacement inquiry not been dispositive.
In discussing the “prescribed order of decisionmaking,” thereby
implicating the expert agency versus federal court conundrum, the Court
confirmed the priority position of the agency. The Court thus credited
Congress with determining, in the first instance, that a federal agency is
best positioned to analyze the issue, compile the expert evidence, receive
public comments, appreciate the industry to be regulated, seek guidance
in the impacted jurisdiction and consider the global ramifications of any
agency action:
[T]he first decider under the Act is the expert administrative agency,
the second, federal judges—[this prescribed order] is yet another
reason to resist setting emissions standards by judicial decree under
federal tort law. The appropriate amount of regulation in any
particular greenhouse gas-producing sector cannot be prescribed in a
vacuum: as with other questions of national or international policy,
informed assessment of competing interests is required. Along with
the environmental benefit potentially achievable, our Nation’s energy

improperly weighed costs and benefits); David Willet, Sierra Club Applauds Sotomayor
CLUB
PRESS
ROOM
(May
26,
2009),
Nomination,
SIERRA
action.sierraclub.org/site/MessageViewer?em_id=111221.0 (“As we learn more about her record, the
Sierra Club is encouraged by Judge Sotomayor’s opinion in Riverkeeper, Inc. v EPA in which she
ruled in favor of environmental protection and against attempts by the government to ignore true
environmental benefits when enforcing clean water laws.”); J. Wylie Donald, American Electric
Power v. Connecticut: 8-0 The Supreme Court Rules Federal Common Law Is Displaced, CLIMATE
LAWYERS BLOG (June 20, 2011), climatelawyers.com/post/2011/06/20/American-Electric-Power-vConnecticut-8-0-the-Supreme-Court-Rules-Federal-Common-Law-is-Displaced.aspx.
97
See supra notes 16-20, 52-53.
98
See Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2537 (“We need not address the parties’ dispute in this
regard. For it is an academic question whether, in the absence of the Clean Air Act and the EPA
actions the Act authorizes, the plaintiffs could state a federal common law claim for curtailment of
greenhouse gas emissions because of their contribution to global warming. Any such claim would be
displaced by the federal legislation authorizing EPA to regulate carbon dioxide emissions.”).
99
See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 332 (2d Cir. 2009) (concluding
political question doctrine did not bar Plaintiffs’ federal common law cause of action for nuisance
arising from green house gas emissions).
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needs and the possibility of economic disruption must weigh in the
balance. The Clean Air Act entrusts such complex balancing to EPA
in the first instance, in combination with state regulators.100

By contrast, the facts of any particular case constrain Article III
judges. Also, the form of evidence Article III judges can receive
constricts the judges and thus limits the scientific, economic, and
technological resources they can access to make a decision.101
The Court also identified additional factors justifying this prescribed
order of decisionmaking. An agency determination is inherently
precedential—binding upon all citizens—unlike district court decisions
that do not even bind members of the same court.102 Additionally, the
Court apprehended the flood of litigation that might follow “in any
federal district” if district court judges were accorded this ad hoc
decisionmaking authority.103 Thus, to overcome the Court’s reticence to
rule on such issues, any future litigant must be able to surmount the
expertise and resources of the agency, the lack of stare decisis in the
district courts, and the potential for vexatious litigation.
D.

THE RAMIFICATIONS OF THE COURT’S DECISION: LAWSUITS IN
STATE COURTS ALLEGING STATE-LAW CLAIMS

The Court’s straightforward application of the doctrine of
displacement serves only to complicate the coming landscape of climate
change litigation. Indeed, what the Court left unsaid provides the greatest
harbinger for the future of climate change litigation.104
The Court in AEP did not rule on whether the CAA preempted a
100

See Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2539.
See id. at 2539-40; see also Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chamber of Commerce of the
United States of America in Support of Petitioners at 4, Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S.
Ct. 2527 (2011) (No. 10-174), 2011 WL 396512 (“[T]he court of appeals erred in failing to
appreciate that the global nature of climate change and the necessity in any bid for redress to balance
an enormously vast array of interrelated interests [that] are ill-suited to the ad hoc and piecemeal
nature of litigation.”).
102
Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2033 n.7 (2011) (“A decision of a federal district
court judge is not binding precedent in either a different judicial district, the same judicial district, or
even upon the same judge in a different case.” (quoting 18 J. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL
PRACTICE § 134.02[1] [d] (3d ed. 2011)).
103
Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America in
Support of Petitioners, supra note 101, at 15 (citing to Defendants’ oral argument in which counsel
estimated that suits could be maintained against “thousands or hundreds or tens” of other defendants
who could be characterized as “large contributors” to GHG emissions).
104
See Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2539 (ensuring that climate change litigation will
continue in some variant, by recognizing that the EPA’s eventual regulation of GHG emissions will
be reviewable in federal court, and ultimately by the United States Supreme Court).
101
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potential nuisance claim in state court:
In light of our holding that the Clean Air Act displaces federal
common law, the availability vel non of a state lawsuit depends, inter
alia, on the preemptive effect of the federal Act. . . . None of the
parties briefed preemption or otherwise addressed the availability of a
claim under state nuisance law. We therefore leave the matter open
for consideration on remand.105

Although the Court declined to offer an opinion on the ultimate
viability of state-law nuisance theories, the Court also declined to
forestall the prosecution of this theory on remand. Thus the plaintiffs in
AEP continue to hold potentially viable state-law nuisance claims
seeking redress for climate change injuries.
More critically, in addition to the AEP Plaintiffs, potential plaintiffs
throughout the country may hold viable state-law claims seeking relief
for climate change injuries.106 Thus, it is simply a matter of time before
the preemption question is raised through an action arising under state
law.
The Court also predicted further contours of such litigation in noting
that “the Clean Water Act does not preclude aggrieved individuals from
bringing a ‘nuisance claim pursuant to the law of the source state.’”107 In
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, the Court held in a nuisance suit for
interstate water pollution that “the court must apply the law of the State
in which the point source is located.”108 The Court in Ouellette refused to
hold that such a suit must be brought in the “source-state courts,” but
only that “source-state” law must apply.109 In so ruling, the Court
implicitly confirmed the legitimacy of initiating suits applying the law of
the state from where the emissions occur, which could leave the door
open to future federal court litigation applying state law.
Future plaintiffs could theoretically file litigation under the law of
the source state seeking immediate relief, rather than awaiting the federal
105

Id. at 2540 (citation omitted).
See Lawrence Hurley, Va. Supreme Court to Rule on Insurance Coverage of Warming
Claims, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2011, available at www.nytimes.com/cwire/2011/05/19/
19climatewire-va-supreme-court-to-rule-on-insurance-covera-90214.html (predicting that plaintiffs
will continue to pursue state common-law claims for redress of global warming even if the Supreme
Court denies a viable federal common-law cause of action).
107
Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2540. Relying upon Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S.
481, at 489, 491, 497 (1987), a water pollution case, the Court analyzed the case under the Clean
Water Act, and not the CAA, but lower courts may readily rely upon similar reasoning—especially
with the Supreme Court crediting the analogy. Id.
108
Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 487.
109
Id. at 499-500.
106
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agency action upon which the Court relied. Milwaukee v. Illinois
proclaimed that “state and federal common laws cannot coexist,” but
because the Court in AEP ruled the CAA displaced any potential federal
common-law claim, Milwaukee II does not present a hurdle to state
common-law claims.110
Furthermore, the bar for preemption of state law is higher than that
of displacement. Specifically, preemption requires “a clear and manifest
[congressional] purpose.”111 The test for preemption hinges on whether
“state law . . . interferes with the methods by which the federal statute
was designed to reach its goal.”112 Yet, the test for displacement is
merely whether the “statute ‘speak[s] directly to [the] question’ at
issue.”113
Although the Court did not rule out a federal forum for future
climate change claims grounded in source-state law, state courts may
prove more attractive. First, state-court judges likely possess more
experience with the nuances of state law.114 Second, plaintiffs in state
court have the advantage of liberalized standing requirements. For
instance, state courts are not limited by the federal courts’ requirement of
a case or controversy, or the doctrine of justiciability, even when the
state courts address issues of federal law.115 California law relaxes
standing requirements even more, “stating that the Lujan requirements of
concrete injury and redressability are not essential parts of the California
standing test.”116 Additionally, some states lower the standing bar for
plaintiffs litigating environmental issues.117 Fifteen states have
promulgated environmental rights acts or environmental provisions in
their constitutions expanding standing for plaintiffs alleging

110
Robert A. Wyman, Jr. & Michael G. Romey, Pamphlet, GREENHOUSE GAS TORT
LITIGATION § 1.07(1)(d)(i) (Bradley M. Marten ed., 2010).
111
Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2537 (quoting Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 317).
112
Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 494. See Mich. Canners & Freezers Ass’n v. Agric. Mktg. &
Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 477 (1984) (finding the Michigan Act directly interfered with the
federal statute purpose of prohibiting “producers’ associations from coercing a producer to agree to
membership . . . that would impinge on the producer’s independence”).
113
Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2537 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S.
618, 625 (1978)).
114
See H. WILLIAM RYLAARSDAM ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: CIVIL PROCEDURE
BEFORE TRIAL ¶ 3:654 (2011) (opining that federal judges are more receptive and familiar with
federal claims and defenses).
115
Wyman & Romey, supra note 110, § 1.07(1)(b); see also ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490
U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (“We have recognized often that the constraints of Article II do not apply to
state courts . . . .”).
116
Wyman & Romey, supra note 110, § 1.07(1)(b)(i); see also National Paint & Coatings
Ass’n v. California, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 360, 365 (Ct. App. 1997).
117
Wyman & Romey, supra note 110, § 1.07(1)(b)(i).
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environmental harms.118 Some states, including Utah, New Mexico, and
New York (a plaintiff in AEP), have a variant of standing for matters of
“great public import.”119
Commentators have also recognized that plaintiffs in future suits
will simply devise new and alternate theories of liability for climate
change harm in the wake of AEP.120 Accordingly, the Court’s declination
to speak to the issue of preemption in AEP did not take the steam out of
climate change litigation, although the decision may well have redirected
those suits back to state courts.
III. AES CORP. V. STEADFAST INSURANCE CO.: THE VIRGINIA SUPREME
COURT DENIES INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR CLIMATE CHANGE
LITIGATION
On September 16, 2011, the Virginia Supreme Court became the
highest court in the country to address the availability of insurance
coverage for climate change lawsuits, such as AEP.121 The court in
Steadfast considered whether GHG emissions constitute an “occurrence”
under standard language found in most comprehensive general liability
(CGL) policies.122 The Virginia Supreme Court held that because the
alleged damages “were the natur[al] and probable consequence of AES’s
intentional actions,” there was no occurrence.123 Accordingly, the CGL
policies did not cover the policyholder for the alleged damage accruing
from climate change.124
A.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF AES CORP. V. STEADFAST

The defendant policyholder, AES Corporation (hereinafter AES), is
a Virginia-based power company that allegedly emitted GHG emissions

118

Id. at § 1.07(1)(b)(ii).
Id. at § 1.07(1)(b)(iii).
120
See J. Wylie Donald, American Electric Power v. Connecticut: 8-0 The Supreme Court
Rules Federal Common Law Is Displaced, CLIMATE LAWYERS BLOG (June 20, 2011),
climatelawyers.com/post/2011/06/20/American-Electric-Power-v-Connecticut-8-0-the-SupremeCourt-Rules-Federal-Common-Law-is-Displaced.aspx; see also J. Randolph Evans, Joanne L.
Zimolzak & Christina M. Carroll, Is Past Prologue to Climate Change Liability?, LAW360 (May 31,
2011), www.law360.com/articles/247592 (noting that in the weeks following oral argument in AEP,
plaintiffs filed a “new breed of climate change lawsuit” in all fifty states grounded on a public trust
theory).
121
See AES Corp. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 715 S.E.2d 28, 29 (Va. 2011).
122
Id. at 29.
123
Id. at 33-34.
124
Id. at 34.
119
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during the course of its operations in California.125 In February of 2008,
the City of Kivalina, Alaska, and the Native Village of Kivalina, Alaska
(Kivalina plaintiffs), sued AES and twenty-three other energy
companies,126 alleging the following claims for relief: (1) federal
common-law public nuisance, (2) state-law private and public nuisance,
(3) civil conspiracy, and (4) concert of action.127
According to the Kivalina plaintiffs, the companies’ GHG
emissions caused global warming, which in turn melted Arctic sea ice
protecting plaintiffs’ coast from storms and ultimately caused massive
land erosion.128 The plaintiffs sought damages accruing from the forced
relocation of their village as a result of this erosion, including $400
million in relocation costs.129 The district court dismissed the federal
claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding the plaintiffs
lacked standing and the issue was a non-justiciable political question.130
The Kivalina plaintiffs filed an appeal and a Ninth Circuit panel heard
oral argument on November 28, 2011.131
AES tendered its defense of the Kivalina lawsuit to its insurer,
Steadfast Insurance Company (Steadfast). Steadfast insured AES through
its CGL policies, which obligated Steadfast to pay “those sums that
[AES] becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of ‘bodily
injury’ or ‘property damage’ to which th[e] insurance applies.”132 Such
“bodily injury” and “property damage” must be “caused by an
occurrence.”133 The policy defined an occurrence as an “accident,

125

Id. at 29.
Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp. (Kivalina), 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 868 n.1
(N.D. Cal. 2009) (naming defendants (1) ExxonMobil Corporation; (2) BP P.L.C.; (3) BP America,
Inc.; (4) BP Products North America, Inc.; (5) Chevron Corporation; (6) Chevron U.S.A., Inc.; (7)
ConocoPhilips Company; (8) Royal Dutch Shell P.L.C.; (9) Shell Oil Company; (10) Peabody
Energy Corporation; (11) The AES Corporation; (12) American Electric Power Corporation; (13)
American Electric Power Services Corporation; (14) DTE Energy Company; (15) Duke Energy
Corporation; (16) Dynergy Holdings, Inc.; (17) Edison International; (18) MidAmerican Energy
Holdings Company; (19) Mirant Corporation; (20) NRG Energy; (21) Pinnacle West Capital
Corporation; (22) Reliant Energy, Inc.; (23) The Southern Company; and (24) Xcel Energy, Inc.).
127
Id. at 869.
128
Id.
129
Id. (“The resulting erosion has now reached the point where Kivalina is becoming
uninhabitable. Plaintiffs allege that as a result, the Village will have to be relocated, at a cost
estimated to range from $95 to $400 million.” (citation omitted)).
130
Id. at 882–83 (declining to assert supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law
claims).
131
See Kivalina, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Case No. 09-17490
(notice dated October 11, 2011).
132
Complaint at 6, AES Corp. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 715 S.E.2d 28 (Va. 2011) (No. 2008858), 2008 WL 3693418.
133
Steadfast, 715 S.E.2d at 30.
126
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including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same
general harmful condition.”134
Steadfast agreed to provide a defense under a reservation of
rights.135 In July 2008, however, Steadfast filed suit against AES in
Virginia state court, seeking a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to
defend or indemnify AES under the Steadfast policies.136 Steadfast
alleged that the Kivalina plaintiffs’ damages arose from intentional
conduct, which does not constitute an occurrence. Steadfast also
contended that “loss in progress” endorsements barred coverage because
the alleged injury arose prior to the inception of AES’s policies. Finally,
Steadfast argued that the policies’ pollution exclusion precluded
coverage because carbon dioxide is a pollutant.137 AES counterclaimed,
seeking a declaratory judgment that the Steadfast policies entitled it to
coverage.138
Two rounds of summary judgment proceeded in the trial court. The
trial court denied Steadfast’s motion for summary judgment, succinctly
reasoning that the “allegations of negligence, nuisances, intentional
conduct under the exclusion clause, definitions of pollutants and/or the
existence of them, as well as what the parties intended at contract
formation rise and fall on established questions of fact.”139 Thus, because
the parties each relied on extrinsic evidence, the court declined to rule as
a matter of law that there was no duty to defend.140
AES and Steadfast subsequently filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. The trial court granted Steadfast’s motion, holding that the

134

Id.
Id.
136
See Steadfast Ins. Co. v. AES Corp., No. 2008-858, at 1-2 (Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 30, 2009)
(docket).
137
Id. at 9-10. See Steadfast, 715 S.E.2d at 30.
138
Steadfast, 715 S.E.2d at 30.
139
Amended Order, Steadfast Ins. Co. v. AES Corp., No. 2008-858 (Va. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3,
2009), 2009 WL 5242863 (denying Steadfast’s motion for summary judgment).
140
Virginia follows the “eight corners” rule in addressing an insurer’s duty to defend. See
Copp v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 692 S.E.2d 220, 224 (Va. 2010); Brenner v. Lawyers Title Ins.
Corp., 397 S.E.2d 100, 102, 104 (Va. 1990); Am. Online, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 207 F.
Supp.2d 459, 465-66 (E.D. Va. 2002) (applying Virginia law). Under this rule, a court examining the
existence of an insurer’s duty to defend need examine only the “four corners” of the underlying
complaint and the “four corners” of the insurance policy. Steadfast, 715 S.E.2d at 32. The majority
of states across the country employ a variant of this “eight corners” rule, although the rule is
denominated differently. See, e.g., Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 176 (Cal. 1966). Montrose
Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court, 861 P.2d 1153, 1157–61 (Cal. 1993); Waste Mgmt. of Carolinas,
Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 340 S.E.2d 374, 378 (N.C. 1986) (“This is widely known as the
‘comparison test‘: the pleadings are read side-by-side with the policy to determine whether the
events as alleged are covered or excluded. Any doubt as to coverage is to be resolved in favor of the
insured.”).
135
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Kivalina plaintiffs’ allegations of “negligence” were insufficient to allege
an “occurrence” under the Steadfast policies.141 In the final round of
summary judgment, the trial court omitted any discussion of whether the
Steadfast policies’ pollution exclusion precluded coverage.142 On
February 22, 2010, AES appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court.143 On
appeal, the parties addressed both issues.
The Virginia Supreme Court heard oral argument on April 19, 2011.
B.

THE OPINION OF THE VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT IN STEADFAST V.
AES

On September 16, 2011, the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court’s decision. Justice Bernard Goodwyn authored the majority
opinion.144 Senior Justice Koontz authored a concurring opinion, in
which Senior Justice Carrico joined.145
The majority concluded that Steadfast owed no duty to defend AES
against the climate change litigation because intentional GHG emissions,
even those with unintended results, did not constitute an “accident” (i.e.,
an “occurrence”) under the policy.146 Notably, Justice Koontz concurred
in the result but emphasized that the holding should be limited to the
particular facts of this case.147 The Virginia Supreme Court based its
decision on the following reasoning.
i.

Focus on the Four Corners of the Complaint

Consistent with Virginia’s “eight corners” rule, by which a court
considering coverage reviews the four corners of the complaint and the
four corners of the insurance policy, the court first considered in detail
the complaint in the underlying Kivalina case.148 The Kivalina complaint
alleged that AES “intentionally emits millions of tons of carbon dioxide

141

AES Corp. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 715 S.E.2d 28, 30 (Va. 2011).
Brief of Appellant at 4, 18, AES Corp. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 715 S.E.2d 28 (Va. 2011)
(No. 100764), 2010 WL 6893538.
143
The Virginia Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction over an appeal of a general civil
judgment from a Virginia circuit (or district) court. In contrast, Virginia Courts of Appeals have
limited appellate jurisdiction, generally hearing matters involving domestic relations or certain
administrative issues. See www.courts.state.va.us/courts/cav/about.html (discussing limited
jurisdiction of the Virginia Court of Appeals).
144
Steadfast, 715 S.E.2d at 29, 34.
145
Id. at 34.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id. at 32.
142
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and other greenhouse gases into the atmosphere annually.”149 The
Kivalina complaint also alleged that AES “knew or should have known
of the impacts of [its] emissions” of carbon dioxide, yet “despite this
knowledge” AES continued to contribute to global warming.”150
ii.

No Occurrence

Both AES and Steadfast agreed that the “eight corners” rule applied;
thus, the court could consider only the “four corners” of the Kivalina
complaint and the “four corners” of the Steadfast policies when
determining the existence of a duty to defend.151 The court also
acknowledged the well-settled principle that an insurer’s duty to defend
is broader than its duty to pay; the duty to defend will arise “whenever
the complaint alleges facts and circumstances, some of which would, if
proved, fall within the risk covered by the policy.”152
Looking to the “four corners” of the policy, and in particular the
definition of occurrence, the court concluded that occurrence was
synonymous with an “accident” that was unexpected “from the
viewpoint of the insured.”153 The court explained further than an
“accident” is “an event which creates an effect which is not the natural or
probable consequence of the means employed and is not intended,
designed, or reasonably anticipated.”154 Consequently, an “intentional”
act cannot be an “occurrence” or an “accident.”155 In other words, “[i]f a
result is the natural and probable consequence of an insured’s intentional
act, it is not an accident.”156
The court recognized, however, a caveat to the seemingly
straightforward “occurrence” test. In these circumstances, the dispositive
issue is not whether the conduct was intended, but rather, whether the
149
Steadfast, 715 S.E.2d at 30(emphasis added); see also id. at 31 (citing to paragraph 252 of
the Kivalina complaint, which alleges: “Defendants know or should know that their emissions of
greenhouse gases contribute to global warming, to the general public injuries such heating will
cause, and to Plaintiff’s special injuries. Intentionally or negligently, defendants have created,
contributed to, and/or maintained the public nuisance.”).
150
Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
151
Id. at 32.
152
Id. (quoting Va. Elec. Power Co. v. Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 475 S.E.2d 264,
265-66 (Va. 1996)).
153
Id. (citing Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 286 S.E.2d 225, 226 (Va. 1982)).
154
Id. (citing Lynchburg Foundry Co. v. Irvin, 16 S.E.2d 646, 648 (Va. 1941)); see also Fid.
& Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. Allied Realty Co., 384 S.E.2d 613, 615 (Va. 1989) (accidental
injury “happen[s] by chance, or unexpectedly; taking place not according to the usual course of
things; casual, fortuitous”).
155
See Steadfast, 715 S.E.2d at 32.
156
Id.
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resulting harm was a “reasonably anticipated consequence” of the
insured’s intentional act. Specifically, if the insured’s action initiated a
chain of events intentionally performed, but the alleged injury results
from an unforeseen cause that is “out of the ordinary expectations of a
reasonable person,” then the injury may still be caused by an occurrence
(and thus within coverage).157 Thus, the perspective of a hypothetical
“reasonable person,” and not the subjective intent of the particular
insured, is considered in the equation.158
AES had argued that the Kivalina complaint alleged in the
alternative that AES acted either “[i]ntentionally or negligently,” and that
AES “knew or should know.”159 AES thus argued that Steadfast must
defend AES in an underlying litigation when allegations of negligence
arise from the underlying complaint, such as in Kivalina.160 AES further
argued that allegations it “should know” the consequences demonstrated
that the resulting injury was “accidental from the viewpoint of AES and
within the definition of an ‘occurrence.’”161
The Virginia Supreme Court declined to view the existence of an
“occurrence” from the viewpoint of the policyholder. The court reasoned
that the policies at issue in Steadfast did not contemplate coverage for
“all suits against the insured alleging damages not caused intentionally,”
nor did the policy contemplate coverage for “all damage resulting from
AES’s negligent acts.”162 Instead, the Virginia Supreme Court reasoned
that the “occurrence” requirement trumped any such expansions to the
grant of coverage, stating:
In the Complaint, Kivalina plainly alleges that AES intentionally
released carbon dioxide into the atmosphere as a regular part of its
energy-producing activities. Kivalina also alleges that there is clear
scientific consensus that the natural and probable consequence of such
emissions is global warming and damages such as Kivalina suffered.
Whether or not AES’s intentional act constitutes negligence, the nature

157

Id. (citing ERIC M. HOLMES, APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE 2D § 129.2(I)(5) (2002 & Supp.

2009)).
158

See id. at 32-33 (“Thus, resolution of the issue of whether Kivalina’s Complaint alleges an
occurrence covered by the policies turns on whether the Complaint can be construed as alleging that
Kivalina’s injuries, at least in the alternative, resulted from unforeseen consequences that a
reasonable person would not have expected to result from AES’s deliberate act of emitting carbon
dioxide and greenhouse gases.”).
159
Id. at 33.
160
Id. (citing Parker v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 278 S.E.2d 803 (Va. 1981)).
161
Steadfast, 715 S.E.2d at 33 (emphasis added). “In essence, AES argues that the damage to
the village resulting from global warming caused by AES’s electricity-generating activities was
accidental because such damage may have been unintentional.” Id.
162
Id.
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and probable consequence of that intentional act is not an accident under
Virginia law.163
In other words, from the viewpoint of the hypothetical reasonable
person, the resulting damage from GHG emissions was plainly
foreseeable. The fact that AES may have subjectively been unaware or
ignorant of the likelihood of such damage, and thus negligent, was
irrelevant to the calculus.164
The Virginia Supreme Court thus adheres to, and indeed recited
twice, that “when the insured knows or should have known the
consequences of his actions, there is no occurrence and therefore no
coverage.”165 By injecting the notion that the insured “should have
known” the consequence of his or her actions, the analysis no longer is
subjective and individualized. Instead, the court’s analysis is predicated
upon an objective consideration of what a “reasonable” person would
have perceived.166 The Steadfast decision thus perpetuates Virginia’s
alignment with those courts across the country that decline to consider
the insured’s subjective intent in assessing whether damages were the
result of an “occurrence.”167
iii. Pollution Exclusion
The court’s decision, declining to find an occurrence, mooted
consideration of whether the Steadfast policies’ pollution exclusions
would apply to defeat coverage. The issue of whether carbon dioxide
might be excluded as a pollutant under a CGL policy’s pollution
exclusion is hotly contested by policyholders and insurers.168
163

Id.
See id. (“Inherent in [the allegation that AES knew or should have known] is the assertion
that the results were a consequence of AES’s intentional actins that a reasonable person would
anticipate.”).
165
Id. at 33-34 (citing 1 BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON
INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES § 8.03[c] (15th ed. 2011) (emphasis added)).
166
See id. at 34 (“Even if AES were actually ignorant of the effect of its actions and/or did not
intend for such damages to occur, Kivalina alleges its damages were the natural and probable
consequence of AES’s intentional actions. Therefore, Kivalina does not allege that is property
damage was the result of a fortuitous event or accident, and such loss is not covered under the
relevant CGL policies.”).
167
See LEE R. RUSS, COUCH ON INSURANCE §103:27 (3d ed. 2011) (noting dispute as to
whether “expected or intended” element of the term “occurrence” is interpreted objectively or
subjectively; listing cases on both sides of the dispute).
168
Compare J. Robert Renner, Coverage for Climate Change Claims, an Uphill Fight, L.A.
DAILY J., Apr. 4, 2011, available at www.duanemorris.com/articles/static/
renner_dailyjournal_041111.pdf (concluding standard pollution exclusions are broadly drafted, not
ambiguous and plainly exclude liabilities arising from anthropogenic climate change), with John E.
Heintz, Marla H. Kanemitsu & Elizabeth Scanlan, Insurance Coverage for Climate Change Suits:
164
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Steadfast had argued on appeal that “[e]very substance is proper and
benign in its proper place and proper quantity” but can become a
pollutant when these boundaries are breached.169 AES countered that the
insurance policy did not expressly identify carbon dioxide, whereas the
policy delineated other substances.170 AES also argued that carbon
dioxide is “omni-present,” a naturally occurring “odorless and colorless
gas,” and thus hardly in the category of materials deemed “pollutants.”171
The Steadfast court’s failure to reach these issues means that
policyholders and insurers alike must await a future decision to learn if
carbon dioxide will be included within the category of “pollutants” and
thus potentially removed from the coverage scope of many standard
insurance policies.
iv.

The Concurring Opinion

Critically for policyholders who may face future climate change
liabilities, Senior Justice Koontz authored a concurring opinion in
Steadfast.172 Judge Koontz wrote separately to “make clear and
emphasize” that the majority’s holding should be limited to the particular
allegations of the Kivalina lawsuit and the definition of occurrence
contained in the Steadfast policies.173 Justice Koontz shared the concern
of AES that Steadfast’s argument “paints with too broad a stroke,” and
thus threatened truncating the broad duty to defend in cases that did not
share the unique circumstances therein.174
Although the majority sought to distinguish its analysis through a
discussion of the Parker v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. decision,175 in
Judge Koontz’s opinion the majority’s holding could still be
“misconstrued as departing from the rule that the insurer’s duty to defend
should be abrogated only where it is certain that no liability could arise
from the contract of insurance.”176 Thus, although Judge Koontz
concurred in the result, and agreed that the Kivalina complaint did allege
intentional and foreseeable, indeed “inevitable,” damage, Judge Koontz
The Battle Has Begun, ENVTL. CLAIMS J., Mar. 2009, at 46-51 (concluding that insurers face an
“uphill battle” applying standard pollution exclusions to avoid liability for climate change).
169
Brief of Appellee at 40, AES Corp. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 715 S.E.2d 28 (Va. 2011) (No.
100764), 2010 WL 6893536.
170
Id. at 19.
171
Id. at 19-20.
172
Steadfast, 715 S.E.2d at 34 (Koontz, J., concurring).
173
Id.
174
Id.
175
Parker v. Harford Fire Ins. Co., 278 S.E.2d 803 (Va. 1981).
176
Steadfast, 715 S.E.2d at 34-35 (Koontz, J., concurring).
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separately wrote to ensure that the holding of Steadfast remained limited
to that particular policy language and the allegations of the underlying
complaint.177
v.

Rehearing Granted

On October 17, 2011, AES petitioned the Virginia Supreme Court
for a rehearing.178 On January 17, 2012, the court set aside its prior
decision and granted AES’s petition.179 On February 27, 2012, the
Virginia Supreme Court heard oral argument on AES’s petition for
rehearing.180 The court’s decision to rehear the case is unusual and
underscores both the intensity of the debate and the ongoing uncertainty
over insurance coverage for climate change liabilities.181
C.

RAMIFICATIONS OF AES V. STEADFAST

Commentators predicted that the Steadfast decision, as the first case
analyzing insurance coverage in connection with climate change
litigation, would be a bellwether decision of national importance.182 The
court’s decision, however, may be confined to the particular facts and
circumstances of the Steadfast litigation. Additionally, the procedural
posture of the litigation, which removed from consideration the scope of
the pollution exclusion, may further minimize the precedential value of
the Steadfast opinion.
i.

The Steadfast Decision Is Limited to One State Court
The interpretation of insurance policies is a creature of state, not

177

Id. at 35.
Petition for Rehearing, filed by Appellant AES Corporation, in AES Corp. v. Steadfast Ins.
Co, Case No. 100764.
179
Order dated January 17, 2012 in AES Corp. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., Case No. 100764.
180
Latham & Watkins, Insurance Coverage for Climate Change Suits: Virginia Supreme
Court Reconsidering 2011 Steadfast v. AES Decision, CLIENT ALERT (Feb. 16, 2012),
www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub4600_1.pdf.
181
See John G. Nevius, Quite an ‘Occurrence,’ Rehearing in Steadfast v. AES, LAW360
(February 9, 2012) (noting that the Virginia Supreme Court historically grants approximately three
percent of rehearing petitions; declining to predict how the court’s rehearing will impact the scope of
the prior decision).
182
See Steve Jones, Virginia Supreme Court to Decide Insurance Coverage for Climate
Change Suits, MARTEN LAW (June 2, 2011), www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/20110602-insurancecoverage-climate-change (“The case, [Steadfast], is one of first impression and is being closely
followed by both insurers and insureds.”).
178
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federal, law.183 Thus, each state has developed a distinct body of
jurisprudence addressing insurance policy interpretation.184 As a result,
policyholders and insurers regularly search for the more favorable
jurisdiction and enter a race to the courthouse.185 Indeed, many
commentators have opined that Steadfast deliberately filed its declaratory
relief action first and in Virginia, to take advantage of that state’s
reputation for being less than favorable for policyholders.186
The Virginia Supreme Court decision binds only the courts of that
jurisdiction. Thus, other states may well decide the occurrence issue
differently. Indeed, in analyzing whether an “occurrence” had taken
place, other states have focused on the ability of the policyholder,
subjectively, to foresee the resulting damage, not whether such damage
was objectively foreseeable.187 In light of the jurisprudence in these states
183
See H. WALTER CROKEY ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: INSURANCE LITIGATION ¶
15:592 (2011) (“Rights and obligations under an insurance policy are governed primarily by state
law.”); Steve Jones, Virginia Supreme Court Holds that Climate Change Allegations Do Not Trigger
LAW
(Sept.
21,
2011),
Insurer’s
Duty
to
Defend,
MARTEN
www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/20110921-virginia-insurers-duty-to-defend (“However, the fact that
insurance is almost exclusively governed by state law means that a different result could arise in a
different state.”).
184
Courts across the country are split on whether an insurer can recoup defense costs paid
toward claims that ultimately are found to be uncovered. Compare Buss v. Superior Court, 939 P.2d
766, 776–777 (Cal. 1997) (insurer has right to reimbursement of fees exclusively allocable to the
defense of uncovered claims), with Gen. Agents Ins. Co. of Am. v. Midwest Sporting Goods Co.,
828 N.E.2d 1092, 1103 (Ill. 2005) (insurer cannot recover defense costs even if it is later determined
there is no coverage). Courts across the country are also split on the impact of a policyholder’s late
notice of a claim. Compare Shell Oil Co. v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 815, 845 (Ct.
App. 1993) (“California law is settled that a defense based on an insured failure to give timely notice
requires the insurer to prove that it suffered substantial prejudice. Prejudice is not presumed from
delayed notice alone. The insurer must show actual prejudice, not the mere possibility of prejudice.”
(citations omitted)), with Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Livorsi Marine, Inc., 856 N.E. 2d 338, 346 (Ill.
2006) (“We also hold that once it is determined that the insurer did not receive reasonable notice of
an occurrence or a lawsuit, the policyholder may not recover under the policy, regardless of whether
the lack of reasonable notice prejudiced the insurer.”).
185
E.g., Save Power Ltd. v. Syntek Fin. Corp., 121 F.3d 947, 950 (5th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he
court in which an action is first filed is the appropriate court to determine whether subsequently filed
cases involving substantially similar issues should proceed.”). Thus the second-filed court’s role is
often limited to determining whether to stay, transfer, or dismiss its proceeding. Twin City Ins. Co.
v. Key Energy Servs., Inc., No. H-09-0352, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46267, at *16-17 (S.D. Tex. June
2, 2009).
186
E.g., Mike Tsikoudakis, Steadfast Insurance Has No Duty to Defend in Climate Suit,
BUSINESS INSURANCE (Sept. 25, 2011), www.businessinsurance.com/article/20110925/NEWS06/
309259993? tags=%7C61%7C75 %7C302# (citing a source characterizing Virginia as “insurerfriendly”).
187
E.g., Siagha v. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 762 N.Y.S.2d 46, 47–48 (App. Div. 2003)
(CGL policy; “a court, when deciding whether a loss is the result of an accident . . . must determine
from the point of view of the insured, whether the loss was unexpected, unusual and unforeseen”)
(internal quotation marks omitted); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Terra Indus., Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d
899, 919 (N.D. Iowa 2002) (applying Iowa law to general liability and umbrella policies, and
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confirming the application of a subjective viewpoint, these same states
may decide the issue differently, which suggests that coverage for
climate change liabilities nonetheless may be available to policyholders
in other states. Thus, as plaintiffs bring new climate change claims under
state tort law, other state courts addressing the related coverage disputes
may reach different conclusions about whether the unintended effects of
intentional emissions constitute an occurrence. In these states, defendants
may obtain an insurer-funded defense of these litigations, which could
greatly alter the complexion, and any ultimate resolution, of climate
change litigation.

recognizing that “where the insured neither intended nor expected” the “damage” there was an
“occurrence”), aff’d, 346 F.3d 1160 (8th Cir. 2003); Potomac Ins. of Ill. v. Huang, No. 00-4013-JPO,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4710, at *20 (D. Kan. Mar. 1, 2002) (unpublished) (applying Kansas law to
CGL policy, and recognizing “the Kansas Supreme Court would find that the damage that occurs as
a result of faulty or negligent workmanship constitutes an ‘occurrence’ as long as the insured did not
intend for the damage to occur” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Gibson v. Farm Family Mut.
Ins. Co., 673 A.2d 1350, 1353 (Me. 1996) (general liability policy; finding an “occurrence” because
a “consequence that follow[ed] from” insureds’ intentional act could be “unintentional despite the
fact that [the act was] intentional”); Hudson Ins. Co. v. City of Chi. Heights, 48 F.3d 234, 237 (7th
Cir. 1995) (applying Illinois law to excess and umbrella policies, and recognizing that “claims for
intentional [acts] can fall under the definition of occurrence as long as the injuries incurred were not
specifically intended or expected” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Montrose Chem. Corp. v.
Superior Court, 861 P.2d 1153, 1164 (Cal. 1993) (“expected” damage is governed by a subjective
test and examines “whether the insured knew or believed its conduct was substantially certain or
highly likely to result in that kind of damage”); Portal Pipe Line Co. v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 845 P.2d
746, 749 (Mont. 1993) (excess policies; recognizing that “the word ‘occurrence’ ha[s] a broader
definition than the word ‘accident’ and that the intent of the policy is to insure the acts or omissions
of the insured, including his intentional acts, excluding only those in which the resulting injury is
either expected or intended from the insured’s standpoint”); Lane v. Worcester Mut. Ins. Co., 430
N.E.2d 874 876 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982) (CGL and general liability policies; “[A]n act committed
intentionally but without malice or desire to injure can lead to accidental results.”); Otterman v.
Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 298 A.2d 547, 551 (Vt. 1972) (liability policy; finding an “occurrence”
where insured did not “expect[]” the “result” of his act); see also Lamar Homes, Inc. v. MidContinent Cas. Co., 242 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2007) (CGL policy; recognizing that “a deliberate act,
performed negligently, is an accident if the effect is not the intended or expected result” (emphasis
added)); MAMSI Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Callaway, 825 A.2d 995, 1000 (Md. 2003) (life
insurance policy; recognizing that the appropriate test of whether an “accident” occurred is “whether
the damage caused by the actor’s intentional conduct was unforeseen, unusual and unexpected”
(emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted)); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. CTC Dev.
Corp., 720 So. 2d 1072, 1076 (Fla. 1998) (CGL policy; holding that “where the term ‘accident’ in a
liability policy is not defined, the term, being susceptible to varying interpretations, encompasses not
only ‘accidental events,’ but also injuries or damage neither expected nor intended from the
standpoint of the insured”); Town of Huntington v. Hartford Ins. Group, 415 N.Y.S.2d 904, 907
(App. Div. 1979) (CGL policy; “[I]t is not legally impossible to find accidental results flowing from
intentional causes, i.e., that the resulting damage was unintended although the original act or acts
leading to the damages were intentional.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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The Steadfast Decision Is Limited to One Particular Policy

As the concurring opinion dramatically underscored, the specific
policy terms at issue here limit the court’s interpretation. Judge Koontz
separately wrote to make certain that the holding of Steadfast was not
“misconstrued” as a general limitation on the insurer’s broad duty to
defend a potentially covered claim.188 In so writing, Judge Koontz
provided direct support for future litigants who seek to distinguish their
coverage circumstances from Steadfast. Although the majority opinion
may provide significant support for insurers in forthcoming insurance
coverage disputes—especially in Virginia—Judge Koontz’s opinion is
powerful ammunition for policyholders to counter these arguments.
iii. The Unresolved Application of the Pollution Exclusion to Climate
Change Liabilities Remains Pivotal
A coverage court in the future may well conclude, contrary to the
Steadfast court, that the allegations of an underlying climate change
complaint describe an occurrence sufficient to trigger an insurer’s duty to
defend, because the occurrence determination is bound by each state’s
insurance coverage jurisprudence. Thus, the ultimate issue of an insurer’s
liability for climate change will likely rest at the application of a policy’s
pollution exclusion—an issue upon which the Virginia Supreme Court
remained silent.
The procedural posture of Steadfast prevented the Virginia Supreme
Court from opining on the application of a standard pollution exclusion189
to the circumstances of global warming. Nevertheless, other judges
188

AES Corp. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 715 S.E.2d 28, 34 (Va. 2011) (Koontz, J., concurring).
Since the mid-1970’s most CGL policies have included a pollution exclusion of some
vintage. See H. WALTER CROKEY ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: INSURANCE ¶ 7:2060
(2011) (citing ISO form; “This insurance does not apply: . . . to . . . property damage arising out of
the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic
chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or
upon land, the atmosphere . . . but this exclusion does not apply . . . if such discharge, dispersal,
release or escape is sudden and accidental.” (first emphasis added)). The first pollution exclusions
utilized in the mid-1970’s were less restrictive than those currently in use, which are termed
“absolute” pollution exclusions. See id. ¶ 7:2085 (citing ISO form; “This insurance does not apply
to . . . property damage arising out of the actual, alleged, or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage,
migration, release or escape of pollutants: at or from any premises, site or location which is or was
at any time owned or occupied by . . . any insured . . . .” (emphasis added)). Because allegations of
GHG emissions (and the alleged damage) may span decades, a policyholder may seek to trigger an
entire portfolio of insurance policies reaching back into the 1960s. Thus, a single policyholder may
seek coverage under polices issued before the 1970s, which include no limitation on pollutionrelated liabilities, as well as policies issued since the 1970s that include variations of a pollution
exclusion.
189

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/gguelj/vol5/iss2/7

30

Miller: Climate Change Litigation

2012]

CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION

373

reviewing the circumstances of AEP and Steadfast have noted in dicta
that carbon dioxide may not qualify as a pollutant because it is omnipresent and harmless in its natural state.190
Thus, although commentators have suggested that the Steadfast
decision could “chill” future coverage litigation and/or dissuade
policyholders from aggressively seeking coverage, the limitations on the
Steadfast decision significantly undermine these predictions.191
Additionally, the damages implicated by global warming, both in terms
of defense costs and settlements/judgments, are substantial. Faced with
significant liability and unsettled case law, policyholders will remain,
even in the wake of the Steadfast decision, motivated to obtain insurance
coverage for these liabilities.192 Both plaintiffs and defendants in future
global warming cases must be attuned, in light of Steadfast and statespecific insurance coverage jurisprudence, as to how the allegations of
“damage” may, or may not, fit within the coverage provisions of policies
that could respond to these liabilities.
IV. THE INTERSECTION OF AEP & STEADFAST
Commentators watching and waiting for the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court in AEP and the Virginia Supreme Court in
Steadfast prognosticated that these decisions would prove to be
bellwether opinions that could significantly transform the future of
climate change litigation, and indeed, the progression of global warming.
Both courts took measured approaches to the epic issues before them,
reserving for a later day key issues.
In so doing, these courts guaranteed future climate change litigation

190
See Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2538. (addressing pre-emption, the Supreme Court
reasoned, “Congress could hardly preemptively prohibit every discharge of carbon dioxide unless
covered by a permit. After all, we each emit carbon dioxide merely breathing.”). Similarly, during
oral argument on cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial judge in Steadfast made statements
indicating that he may not view carbon dioxide as a pollutant. When asked to clarify whether his
January 7, 2010, statement that “carbon dioxide is not a pollutant” was a ruling, the judge stated,
“Well, it’s not a ruling. We were just talking. Otherwise we would all have to stop breathing. We’re
polluting right now. I believe that then, I believe it now. But that’s not a ruling as it relates to the
issues in that case.” Transcript of Hearing on Motions for Summary Judgment at 4, Steadfast Ins.
Co. v. AES Corp. (Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 19, 2010) (No. 2008-858).
191
E.g., Tsikoudakis, supra note 186.
192
See Lawrence Hurley, Va. Supreme Court to Rule on Insurance Coverage of Warming
Claims, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2011 (noting that even after courts rule on these cases, plaintiffs will
still be harmed by climate change and look for “deep pockets” to pay for these liabilities meaning
more insurance coverage disputes); Tsikoudakis, supra note 186 (“Coverage for environmental
liabilities has always been a controversial area rife with litigation. This decision is only the first
round in what likely will be a long fight over policyholder rights.”).
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and related coverage disputes.193 AEP at most represents a bump in the
road for plaintiffs seeking redress for climate change liabilities. As noted
supra in Part II.D, climate change litigation is destined to continue in at
least three variants: (1) the anticipated and expressly sanctioned federal
court review of the EPA’s eventual occupation of the field; (2) the statelaw claims of the AEP plaintiffs which were subject to remand; and (3)
claims in state courts by future litigants, including claims based on new,
as yet undeveloped or unarticulated, theories.
By the same token, litigation concerning the scope of insurance
coverage for climate change liabilities remains in its preliminary
stages.194 Steadfast was the first, but certainly not the last, decision
interpreting who will ultimately foot the bill for climate change
liabilities.195 Because insurance coverage jurisprudence is state-specific,
the Steadfast decision may well be confined to Virginia.196 With the
scope of the pollution exclusion still unsettled, and Judge Koontz’s
concurrence emboldening policyholders, insurers potentially remain at
risk for these liabilities.197
Lynchpin issues remain unaddressed in both opinions. Thus, the
progeny of AEP and Steadfast will prove to be the more transformative,
bellwether decisions.
V.

CONCLUSION
With the holdings of both AEP and Steadfast silent on predicate

193

See Lawrence Hurley, Va. Court Rules That Insurance Doesn’t Cover Global Warming
Claims, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2011, available at www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/09/16/16greenwireva-court-rules-that-insurance-doesnt-cover-glo-97999.html (“Despite . . . [the AEP] outcome,
lawyers expect cases against utilities over climate change featuring different legal theories to
continue.”); see also J. Randolph Evans, Joanne L. Zimolzak & Christina M. Carroll, Is Past
Prologue to Climate Change Liability?, LAW360 (May 31, 2011), www.law360.com/articles/247592
(“Emitters (and their insurers) can expect a steady stream of probative complaints based on steadily
evolving legal theories until one reached the magic combination or the Congress simply preempts
the area.”).
194
See Lawrence Hurley, Va. Court Rules That Insurance Doesn’t Cover Global Warming
Claims, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2011 (“Litigation over insurance coverage relating to climate change
is likely to grow in coming years. . . .”).
195
See, e.g., John G. Nevius, Arguing the Future of Climate Change Litigation, LAW360
(May 3, 2011), www.law360.com/articles/242484 (“One thing is certain: Legal disputes related to
climate change and the insurance industry’s obligations related thereto will be with us for some time
to come.”); Mike Tsikoudakis, supra note 186 (reporting that Steadfast is not the “last” coverage
case in this area).
196
See Hurley, supra note 194 (observing that Steadfast decision is limited to Virginia, and
“[s]imilar cases will be decided on a state-by-state basis”).
197
See id. (Steadfast ruling represents “an initial victory for insurers in the field of unfolding
climate change liability”).
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issues, the long-term viability of judicial action to redress climate change
is not out of steam. Instead, plaintiffs and defendants will be looking to
state courts across the country for direction on whether these claims are
cognizable, and if so, who will ultimately bear the cost of global
warming.
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